The Global Beat by Gerald Lacuarta

A medical evacuation should be a straightforward humanitarian operation. On October 8, getting a sick Filipino sailor out of Ayungin Shoal became another confrontation over who gets to exercise authority in the West Philippine Sea.

According to the Philippine Coast Guard, a Chinese coast guard vessel activated its water cannon while approaching BRP Cabra, which had been deployed to evacuate a Navy serviceman stationed aboard BRP Sierra Madre. Cabra was not hit. But the Coast Guard reported that obstruction, shadowing, and dangerous maneuvers prolonged an operation that ordinarily would have taken only a few hours to nearly ten.

The sailor was eventually transferred and received medical attention. The larger question remained: how does the Philippines prevent interference with its operations from becoming an accepted condition of its presence at sea?

Calling Manila’s predicament a “balancing act” captures the difficulty but leaves the purpose unclear. Balance is a method. The objective must be to protect Philippine rights while reducing the vulnerabilities that make exercising them more costly.
Substantial pressure

The Armed Forces of the Philippines reported monitoring 101 Chinese naval and coast guard vessels across four key West Philippine Sea areas in September, compared with 56 in August. These are monthly monitoring totals, not a claim that all those ships assembled at once. Even with that qualification, the increase deserves attention.

So does the language accompanying the ships. Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan’s remark that China “may easily win” if it used force prompted the Department of Foreign Affairs to summon him on October 19. He also said Beijing would refrain from force because it wanted peace. Manila nevertheless objected to what it considered a threat.

A declaration of peaceful intent is difficult to separate from a reminder of superior force when smaller vessels are already encountering pressure at sea.

Yet outrage alone offers little protection. The Philippines needs sustained patrols, reliable logistics, capable vessels, and partnerships that improve its ability to operate. Publicizing incidents helps establish a record and mobilize support. Its practical value increases when exposure produces assistance, diplomatic consequences, or safer operations.

The legal foundation must remain clear. The 2016 arbitral award rejected China’s claims to historic rights beyond the limits permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It also recognized traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal for Filipino and Chinese fishermen. It did not decide sovereignty over the shoal.

Sovereignty over land features and sovereign rights over resources are different legal questions. Describing everything as a territorial disagreement obscures rights that have already been clarified.

For fishing communities in Zambales, the issue is measured in access to fishing grounds and the ability to return with a worthwhile catch. A legal victory has limited everyday meaning if a fisherman remains unable to work safely where his rights are recognized.

That makes protecting livelihoods a test of maritime policy. Government should assess whether its actions improve access and safety, alongside counting patrols, protests, and diplomatic statements.

Economic constraints
Preliminary Philippine Statistics Authority figures show that mainland China supplied 22.7 percent of Philippine goods imports in August. It also received 11.5 percent of Philippine goods exports, while Hong Kong accounted for another 17.3 percent. Those export destinations should remain separately identified, but the figures show the scale of the commercial relationship.

Abruptly severing those links would impose costs on Philippine businesses and consumers. Accepting that reality, however, does not require treating present dependence as permanent.

The useful response is targeted diversification. Government and industry should identify essential goods with few alternative suppliers, help firms develop other sources, and expand export markets. Such work is slower and less visible than a diplomatic confrontation. It can also give future Philippine governments more room to act.

Diplomacy and communication
There is a similar need for discipline in diplomacy. A South China Sea Code of Conduct would be valuable if it establishes meaningful rules and reduces dangerous encounters. Completing a document by a summit deadline is a poor substitute for securing an effective agreement.

Joint oil and gas exploration also deserves careful examination. Calling a proposal “commercial” cannot by itself resolve questions about Philippine law, control, and resource rights. Cooperation must rest on terms the country can defend publicly.
Communication should remain available for preventing accidents and resolving emergencies. A channel for dialogue need not become a system for seeking permission to conduct lawful Philippine operations. Those are different functions, and Manila should insist on keeping them distinct.

The country cannot quickly erase the imbalance in ships or economic power. It can strengthen its capacity, protect vulnerable communities, and steadily reduce avoidable dependence.

That is the standard by which this balancing act should be judged: whether sailors can be supplied and evacuated safely, fishermen can reach their grounds, and Philippine decisions become less vulnerable to outside pressure.

The Philippines should keep trading and talking with China. It should also build the strength to ensure that a Filipino sailor’s medical evacuation never becomes a negotiation over permission.